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Abstract
The recent financial crisis of 2008 and the 2011 indebtedness of Greece highlight the im-
portance of understanding the structure of the global financial network. In this paper we
set out to analyze and characterize this network, as captured by the IMF Coordinated Port-
folio Investment Survey (CPIS), in two ways. First, through an adaptation of the “error
and attack” methodology [1], we show that the network is of the “robust-yet-fragile” type,
a topology found in a wide variety of evolved networks. We compare these results against
four common null-models, generated only from first-order statistics of the empirical data.
In addition, we suggest a fifth, log-normal model, which generates networks that seem to
match the empirical one more closely. Still, this model does not account for several higher
order network statistics, which reenforces the added value of the higher-order analysis.
Second, using loss-given-default dynamics [2], we model financial interdependence and
potential cascading of financial distress through the network. Preliminary simulations in-
dicate that default by a single relatively small country like Greece can be absorbed by the
network, but that default in combination with defaults of other PIGS countries (Portugal,
Ireland, and Spain) could lead to a massive extinction cascade in the global economy.
Intro
Globalization has created an international financial network of countries linked
by trade in goods and assets. These linkages allow for more efficient resource
allocation across borders, but also create potentially hazardous financial interde-
pendence, such as the global ripple following the 2008 collapse of Lehman Broth-
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2ers and the potential financial distress that may follow the potential restructuring
of Greece’s debt obligations. Increasingly, the tools of network science are be-
ing used as a means of articulating in a quantitative way measures of financial
interdependence and stability.
Network approaches have proved useful for articulating the interdependence
of many kinds of complex systems, including economic systems and the global
economy (see e.g., [3, 4]). Of particular relevance are the studies of the World
Trade Web (WTW), derived from OECD data [5], in which countries are linked
according to the value of exports between them. The WTW articulates just one
aspect of the global economy and the focus herein is on the international financial
asset network as derived from the CPIS, a key financial network whose assets grew
by a factor of 13.5 in real US dollars in the three decades leading up to the 2008
financial crisis [6], exceeding annual world GDP in 2006 and 2007. Our interest
is in characterizing the structure of the CPIS network, especially as it relates to
aspects of systemic risk related to nation default. While the related problem of
bank “contagion” in interbank networks has drawn much interest (see e.g., [7–
10]), the analogous problem considered at the scale of nations in the network of
inter-nation investment has attracted much less research attention, in spite of its
acknowledged and reported importance for the safety and health of the global
economy [11]. Initial efforts in this direction have been made via the study of
degree distributions [12, 13].
In particular, in this paper we perform two kinds of analyses. In the first we
perform so-called “knockout experiments” on a network of countries connected
according to a threshold in their CPIS financial relationship. In these experiments
countries are removed one by one from the network (via some criteria explained
below) and with this, all connections to and from the corresponding nodes. Ro-
bustness is measured according to the degradation in connectivity as measured
by an increase in the average shortest path length (ASPL) of the network; ASPL
provides a natural proxy for financial integration. Knockout methodology has
already been applied in a variety of contexts, including the World Wide Web
(WWW) [1], metabolic networks [14], protein networks [15], and in the form of
extinction analyses conducted on food web models of ecosystems (see e.g., Sec-
tion 4.6 of [16] and the many references therein as well as [17]). In the economic
context knockouts have very recently been applied to study the WTW [18].
3The Network
We derive the international financial network structures from the IMF’s CPIS
database. The IMF CPIS comprises bilateral annual data from 2001 to 2009 de-
rived from the external portfolio of financial assets aggregated at the country level
from up to 73 reporting countries vis-a`-vis 237 countries [19, 20]. External assets
are reported in terms of millions of current US dollars (USD) and thresholded
at 500,000 USD. If we restrict the network to reporting countries with available
GDP data [21, 22], we obtain a subset of at least 64 countries for each year. The
portfolios of these countries restricted to the same subset give a self-contained
network that accounts for at least 97.4 percent of their total external assets. For
the sake of analytical consistency, we restrict our analysis to these core subsets.
We encode a principal binary network structure for these core subsets in two
adjacency matrices A, and B, by applying two different thresholding rules. For a
given year, let si j denote the amount of country i’s assets issued by residents of
country j and let n be the number of countries in the core subset under investiga-
tion. Then, matrix A encodes an edge (ai j = 1) if si j >∑k 6=i
sik
n−1 , that is, if country
i’s portfolio contains above average exposure to country j. See Figure 1 for a
visualization of the representation of A for the 2009 data. Matrix B, on the other
hand, encodes an edge (bi j = 1) if si j/GDPi exceeds a threshold t = .0417, repre-
senting the average %4.17 percent GDP-normalized investment in these networks.
We choose these two simplified representations of the network, but acknowledge
the hidden complexity that is missed in the aggregation of assets in the CPIS data
and simplified international financial links. Future work should work to articu-
late the finer detail; we see this paper as a first and necessary step toward a more
sophisticated analysis.
Given the binary directed networks, we generate comparison networks ac-
cording to four common null-models. For the simplest, Erdo´s-Renyi (ER) model,
G1 (n, p) has n nodes and an edge between any two nodes exist with probability
p = d¯/(n−1), where d¯ is the average out-degree of the empirical network. For
the second and third models, G2 (n, [p]i) and G
3(n, [p] j) have an edge between
countries i and j with probabilities pi = douti /(n−1) and p j = dinj /(n−1), where
douti and d
in
j are country i and j’s empirical out- and in-degree. Finally, the fourth
model assigns equal probability to all graphs G4 (n, [in]i , [out]i) that preserve the
in- and out-degree of A. To generate such graphs, we use the rewiring approach
(see e.g., [23]). Thus, these four null models each generate networks based only
on an increasing number of first order characteristics of the empirical binary net-
work.
4Fig. 1: The international financial network in 2009 as derived from the CPIS
data. The graph shows a directed edge from country i to country j, if
i’s asset holdings w.r.t j exceeds its average exposure to other countries.
Successively darkened edges indicate a corresponding exposure that is at
least 2×, 4×, 8× or above 16× the average exposure. Nodes are color
coded by different geographical regions as defined by the UN.
5We also make use of a fifth null comparison model that takes into account the
weight distribution of the original asset network. We find a reasonable fit to the
asset distributions by using a log-normal model with country dummies
ln
(
si j+1
)
= αi+β j+ εi j, (1)
where αi and β j are constants for each country as q holder and issuer of assets,
and ε∼N (0,σ). The plus one term on the LHS is a work-around, given that the
CPIS data is left censored. We use maximum-likelihood estimation to predict the
α’s, β’s and σ.1 Figure 2(a) shows the distribution of predicted εi j after fitting this
model to all nine years of available data. While a Jarque–Bera test rejects that
these residuals are normally distributed for several years, this test similarly results
in a type I error when applied to data generated by the log-normal model but was
left-censored and rounded. Comparing the predicted residual distributions of the
empirical and generated data visually provides further evidence that this simple
model fits the empirical data surprisingly well.
Error and Attack
We test the robustness of the CPIS network as captured by matrices A or B via
the effect of “error and attack” simulations [1] on the average shortest path length
(ASPL) in the network. Here the network is subjected to the iterated removal
of either a random node (via “error”) or the most “important” (via “attack”), as
measured by the sum of a node’s in- and out-degree. While other measures of
importance can also be used, our measure follows intuitively as this ‘attack’ takes
out the greatest number of direct paths, thus attacking the tracked ASPL measure.
The shortest path length (SPL) between any two nodes is a useful proxy for
financial integration; a low SPL indicates a high degree of direct investment (a
shortest path length of one) and common investment through cross-border posi-
tions of intermediate countries (a shortest path length of two). However, as the
length of the SPL grows it becomes a less useful indicator. Also, not all pairs
of nodes have paths between them. Thus we choose a modified measure of the
ASPL, by treating all SPLs greater than three as having a length of four.2 Fig-
ures 3 and 4 show the general evolution of the modified ASPL under repeated
1 Noting that the left-censoring and rounding implicit in the CPIS data downward biases the
σ estimate, we scale this estimate by 1.183, as suggested by fitting the model to generated but
left-censored and rounded data.
2 We also tracked the evolution of simpler measures, such as the fraction of SPLs equal or less
than two. These measured provided qualitatively very similar results.
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Fig. 2: Distribution of residuals for 2001-2009 with overlaid best fit normal dis-
tribution after fitting the log-linear model of (1) to the empirical data and
corresponding generated data.
error or attack for the empirical as well as the null model networks, given the two
specifications.
The simulations reflect the existence of key financial centers. While random
removal of nodes does not noticeably affect ASPL, targeted removal causes an im-
mediate and rapid increase for both types of thresholding. The simulations on net-
works of type A, point to the importance of financial hubs. The empirical network
starts out significantly less ‘integrated’ than the first four null models. Further, the
attack method affects ASPL significantly less in the first two null models which
disregard the in-degrees of countries in the empirical model. As simulations on
the third and fourth null models show, matching the empirical in-degree sequence
is still insufficient to explain the networks lack of greater integration as proxied by
ASPL; though, the log-normal model appears to match the empirical results very
well.
For simulations on the GDP thresholded B networks, the rewiring null model
appears to match the empirical model best. Again, the empirical model starts less
integrated than the first three null models and is particularly susceptible to the first
attack, the removal of the worlds largest economy, the US. The rewiring and the
log-normal model both seem to match these results closely, with the former doing
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Fig. 3: Evolution of ASPL - A – Plots summarize the error and attack analysis
for the empirical network of type A and five null comparison models for 9
separate years of data. The first plot shows the evolution of the modified
ASPL of all 9 empirical networks under targeted attack (red) and the gen-
eral evolution under random errors (blue) showing the mean and standard
deviations of 9× 2000 independent simulations. Subsequent plots super-
impose the general evolution of 9× 2000 generated networks under error
(yellow) and attack (black) by null model.
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Fig. 4: Evolution of ASPL - B – See description of figure 3.
9ER Out-deg. In-deg. Rewiring Log-Normal
Network Measure A B A B A B A B A B
Fraction of SP ≤ 2 -1 -1 -1 0 -.79 -.33 -1 -.56 0 -.11
Fraction of SP ≤ 3 -1 -1 -1 -.33 -1 -.78 -1 -.56 -.11 -.67
Modified ASPL 1 1 1 .33 .89 .78 1 .67 0 .44
Assortativity -1 -1 -1 -.89 1 -.89 1 .78 .11 0
Avg. Clustering Coefficent 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -.22 1 0
Pr(i→ k | i→ j∧ j→ k) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tab. 1: 95% Confidence Interval for Network Measures – The table shows the
fraction of years in which the empirical network measure was below the
95 precent confidence interval (negative) or above (positive) for each null
model and network type. Modified ASPL provides the average shortest
(directed) path length, capping maximum path length at four. Assortativ-
ity and average clustering coefficient follow the Matlab algorithms of the
Brain Connectivity Toolbox. [24]
slightly better. Thus, it appears the observed error-attack effect on the networks’
ASPL may already be encoded in the first order statistics used for the null model.
We formally test whether the ASPL, as well as several other higher order
statistics of the empirical networks, are outliers within the null model families.
For each empirical network we generated 10000 networks of each null-model and
constructed 95 percent confidence intervals for the ASPL and 5 other network
statistics. Table 1) summarizes how often the empirical networks produced mea-
sures below or above these confidence intervals. The results support several of
our above conjectures; e.g we find that the ASPL of the B networks is indeed best
matched rewiring null model. Still, none of the null models can properly account
for all the listed higher order statistics. Notably, the last measure, the probability
that country i has a path to k conditional on i having path to j and j a path to k is
above the confidence intervals of all null models for all years and specifications.
Hence, the null models’ first-order statistics appear unable to account for several
relevant characteristics of the empirical network structure.
Preliminary LGD Simulations
The error and attack methodology does not account for any potential dynamics
– that is, the simulation proceeds simply by successive deletion of nodes with-
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out any accounting for the potential contagion of financial distress. In our sec-
ond set of simulations we attempt to model such potential economic dynamics,
that is, financial interdependence. We adopt so-called loss-given-default (LGD)
dynamics, originally developed for modeling cascades of bank failures [2, 25],
to provide a method of propagating financial shock. The simulation starts with
an initial country or set of countries defaulting on their financial liabilities. Any
other country whose financial positions in the defaulted country/countries exceeds
certain thresholding conditions will also default, which in turn may result in fur-
ther defaults. The simulation terminates when no further countries are defaulting.
Analogous extinction simulations are common as a means for understanding the
robustness of food webs [26], ecological networks whose nodes represent species
in an ecosystem wherein species i is linked to species j if j preys on i (so that
i provides resources to j) [16, 26, 27]. More recently, these kinds of extinction
studies have been analogized to the WTW [18].
We acknowledge that such simulations may be overly simplistic, given the
degree of aggregation of the CPIS data and the great heterogeneity of international
banking activities. Nonetheless, they provide an interesting start for modeling
potentially severe global cascades of financial distress. As a result, the following
analysis is still preliminary.
For the LGD simulations, we specify two separate thresholding conditions. A
country will default if its total investment in the defaulted countries both exceeds
some fraction (d1) of its total external investment and some fraction (d2) of its
GDP; that is, country i will default if ∑ j∈D ai j > d1∑Nj=1 ai j and ∑ j∈D ai j >
d2GDPi, with D being the set of defaulted countries. As a result, threshold d1 in-
corporates a general ability of countries to absorb sufficiently small losses relative
to its portfolio and threshold d2 assumes a country-specific ability to absorb losses
of assets proportional a country’s economic output. Note, we may incorporate a
fact, that a default us unlikely to yield a complete loss of financial assets of the
defaulting country (but a certain haircut) by scaling d1 and d2 appropriately.
As an example, if we choose d1 = d2 = 0.1 and initialize by defaulting any one
of the PIGS countries in the 2007 network, there is at most a single subsequent
default. However if we initialize by defaulting both Greece and Ireland (while
using the same threshold values) then we see (Figure 5) six subsequent rounds of
defaults in a sequence that reflects financial interdependence spreading initially
across Western Europe, which subsequently affects the US and the rest of the
world. In the end, only a subset of mostly emerging market economies survives
the default cascade, as their total amounts of international financial assets are
small relative to their respective GDP.
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Fig. 5: Exogenous Default of Greece and Ireland – The eight graphs show
the iterative default that follows an initial default of Greece and Ireland
within the 2007 financial asset network, assuming threshold condition
d1 = d2 = 0.1. At each step defaulting countries are colored black before
being removed in the following graph. For graphical clarity only edges
of the thresholded network are displayed, that is, an edge represents asset
exposure exceeding 5.81% (the average exposure) of the lending country’s
GDP.
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A broad set of LGD simulations under a range of values for d1 and d2 shows
a notable increase in financial interdependence (as external positions increased)
from 2001 to 2007. We consider all possible model specifications with d1,d2 ∈
{0,0.1,0.25,0.5,0.75}, excluding the trivial case d1 = d2 = 0. For each threshold
specification and year, all possible combinations of the initial default of 1,2, and 3
countries were simulated, to produce the measures of the mean, mean of the worst
5%, and worst-case impact on A. Impact is measured in terms of the fraction
of countries that eventually default under LGD. The analysis shows a general
increase in severity of worst-case contagion from 2001 to 2007; most notably, the
number of d1,d2 specifications that produce a default of more than 55% of the
network in the worst case doubles in 2006 and 2007 (see Figure 6). The LGD
simulations show a decrease in financial interdependence at the end of 2008. The
result may appear counterintuitive. However, the 2008 crises yielded a substantial
amount of asset losses, and an overall reduction in country-to-country foreign
asset positions. Thus, financial interdependence appears lower at the end of 2008,
as the LGD model does not account for already incurred losses. Incorporating
such dynamic aspects may be one area for improvement of our models. Similarly,
simulations could benefit from improved foundations for thresholding conditions.
Average contagion remains very limited over all years, pointing once more to the
general robustness of the network.
The simulations also identify the countries responsible for worst-case impact.
Table 2 lists the ten most influential countries and ten most influential combina-
tions of two or three countries as measured by their worst case default scenarios.
The US is the single most contagious country followed by financial centers like
the UK, the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg (which is tied with Germany for
fourth place). More interesting is the frequent appearance of Brazil, as a partner
(with the United States) in the second most influential pair of countries and then
its prevalence among the most influential triples. Similarly, middle income coun-
tries like Turkey and Indonesia also appear in the top 10 list of influential pairs or
triples. Note, that western countries tend to be strongly linked with the US, while
financial exposure of emerging market economies relative to their GDP tend to
substantially lower. Subsequently, in model specification where a default of the
US is sufficient to bring down the western world, countries like Brazil gain in im-
portance; they can still spur further default within the small remaining network of
emerging market economies, noted above.
Global concerns over the solvency of the PIGS nations motivates us to con-
sider a restricted study of the initial defaults by PIGS countries in 2007. In this
we see the different effects of the two thresholds. Figure 7 shows the degree of
13
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1 Attack Instances 2 Attacks Instances 3 Attacks Instances
United States 540 United Kingdom United States 301 Germany United Kingdom United States 200
United Kingdom 166 Brazil United States 280 Brazil United Kingdom United States 178
Cayman Islands 159 Germany United States 198 Brazil Germany United States 163
Germany 142 Turkey United States 177 Brazil Turkey United States 156
Luxembourg 142 Indonesia United States 174 France United Kingdom United States 154
France 130 France United States 167 Brazil Russia United States 153
Brazil 123 Russia United States 156 Brazil Poland United States 148
Italy 118 Italy United States 155 Brazil Indonesia United States 147
Netherlands 118 South Korea United States 153 Brazil Colombia United States 147
Japan 115 Australia United States 153 Germany Italy United States 146
Tab. 2: Top 10 Most Influential Countries – The top 10 countries and combina-
tion of countries are ranked by the number of times they resulted in the
greatest LGD in the 576 simulations.
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the network’s financial interdependence with respect to any combination of up to
three PIGS countries, with the portfolio threshold d1 ∈ [0,0.2] (with increments
of 0.004) and the GDP threshold d2 ∈ [0,0.5] (with increments of 0.01). For fixed
d2, the portfolio threshold d1 (on the y-axis) in most cases yields only a unique
threshold which determines whether or not a specific initial default leads to fur-
ther defaults, and when it does, the scenario is generally constant. Conversely,
for fixed d1, we see a more graduated behavior in terms of number of defaults,
steadily decreasing as the threshold increases.
Global concerns over the solvency of the PIGS nations motivates us to con-
sider a restricted study of the initial defaults by PIGS countries in 2007. In this
we see the different effects of the two thresholds. Figure 7 shows the degree of
the network’s financial interdependence with respect to any combination of up to
three PIGS countries, with the portfolio threshold d1 ∈ [0,0.2] (with increments
of 0.004) and the GDP threshold d2 ∈ [0,0.5] (with increments of 0.01). For fixed
d2, the portfolio threshold d1 (on the y-axis) in most cases yields only a unique
threshold which determines whether or not a specific initial default leads to fur-
ther defaults, and when it does, the scenario is generally constant. Conversely,
for fixed d1, we see a more graduated behavior in terms of number of defaults,
steadily decreasing as the threshold increases.
Conclusion
We believe that the robustness studies undertaken here are an important first step
in the development of metrics for the study of systemic risk in the global economy.
The application of error and attack analysis on the CPIS network and its effect on
the average shortest path length produce robustness results similar to those of a
scale-free network, indicating robust-yet-fragile structure. Loss-given-default dy-
namics produce simulations that show an increase from 2001 to 2007 in network
fragility with respect to failure of key countries. The different analytical tools all
highlight the key importance of the United States and the centrality of european
countries. In general, most simulations support the idea that a failure of the US
in 2008 would have had far reaching consequences for the entire network. Sim-
ilarly, the concerns over the default of Greece seem real as simulations indicate
that with the failure of Greece (or any of the PIGS nations) the global economy
was one default away from a contagion cascade. Models that assume low thresh-
olds for contagion also predict that the default of a combination of PIGS countries
may be similarly severe. The only countries relatively unaffected by such global
15
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finical crisis seem to be middle income countries, whose external financial assets
are relatively small as a share of their GDP. We believe that these and analogous
knock-out studies may be of use in further refining our understanding of the global
financial network. Further, more targeted simulations may help informing impor-
tant policy decisions.
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